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J. C. Lester (October 2002; revised March 2021) 
The following essay responds to a draft article that criticises the theory of libertarian restitution 
in Escape from Leviathan (EFL).1 The article was freely available to internet search engines. 
Hence, it seems fair and useful to reply to these very welcome objective criticisms. It is not 
intellectually relevant that its author might subsequently and subjectively have thought better 
of them, possibly as a result of the earlier version of this reply. Generally, the article 
misconstrues the position on retribution in EFL. Eventually, it makes apparent qualifications 
to its own position such that there does not seem to be any clear theoretical difference between 
the two on the central disputed issue. EFL’s position is to explain and defend only the non-
normative theory of libertarian restitution: full restoration or compensation to the damaged 
(proactively imposed on) party. But it is argued that this can include a retributive aspect if that 
is what the victim prefers. Moreover, such restitution will tend to act as a deterrent that 
maximises both overall interpersonal liberty (theorised as no proactive impositions) and human 
welfare (theorised as preference satisfaction). 
Having discussed its own views on the issues in question, the article states, “Some Libertarians 
seem to think that not only is Libertarianism compatible with retribution, but that it actually 
requires it. I turn to a recent essay by J. C. Lester”. But EFL argues only that a retributive form 
of restitution is compatible with libertarianism. It does not argue that libertarianism “requires 
it”: a victim could, and probably usually would, opt for only financial or commodity-equivalent 
restitution. The article rightly paraphrases the EFL position that restricting restitution to 
monetary damages “would inadequately reflect the crucial distinction between being 
mistakenly and being knowingly imposed on”. It agrees that the distinction is real but asks, 
“Why should it give rise to a distinction between restitution and retribution?” Again, EFL 
explicitly does not assert any such “distinction”. It says that retribution can be allowable as a 
kind of restitution. For instance, “it is surely a form of restitution … that the victim comes to 
own an equally-valued claim to the criminal’s person or goods” (endnote 148). 
The article cites two of the reasons EFL gives for the supposed “distinction”. But it does not 
mention or answer the question EFL has in endnote 140: “Let me put it another way: on what 
libertarian basis could he complain, if we take a similar action against someone to that which 
he initially imposed on us?” For instance, suppose a man at a party makes an innocuous remark 
that a woman somehow misconstrues and takes offence at. In an act of anger, the woman pours 
her drink over the man’s head and then stands back. There is clearly no further threat from her 
for him to defend himself from. But he then simply chooses to pour his own drink over her 
head. Does the article imply that they were both—and equally—unlibertarian, and now they 
still both owe each other restitution? Other things being equal, these tit-for-tat actions seem to 
more or less cancel each other out: they are quits. More precisely, it looks more plausible to 
say that the initial drink-pourer is unlibertarian, while the responder is merely taking his 
restitution retributively. 
The article states that, “there is nothing in principle about restitution that requires that damages 
be monetary”. And EFL does not say that it does. It explicitly denies it with the very idea of 
 
1 Lester, J. C. Escape from Leviathan: Libertarianism Without Justificationism (Buckingham: 
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retributive restitution; but other forms of non-monetary restitution are also clearly possible. 
The article continues that, “the thought behind Lester’s claim, that inflicting suffering on your 
attacker truly compensates for being attacked, betrays what can only be regarded as a 
thoroughly disheartening view of human nature”. EFL does not assert or imply that this “truly 
compensates”. It is, rather, that if this is what the victim prefers, then that is clearly what he 
regards as the best form of compensation (or, perhaps, the least bad form: for he would probably 
prefer that there had been no proactive imposition in the first place, and—as the article and 
EFL both agree—some crimes cannot be fully compensated for). And it is completely 
irrelevant to the objective libertarian theory that this might appear to some people to be a 
“disheartening view of human nature”. The article continues that, “Morally, it is far superior to 
accept money damages than to demand physical retribution. As is so often the case, greed is a 
great humanizing influence”. Morality is simply not relevant to what libertarian theory 
objectively entails, which is what EFL is trying to determine. But, as a moral aside here, it is 
not clear that retribution is always morally inferior or that monetary damages need reflect 
“greed”. Giving tit for tat might be more moral: the imposer might better be taught a moral, or 
at least prudential, lesson that way. And preferring to take the money might be only personally 
prudent, rather than “greed”. 
We are told that “Lester seems to have an unusual idea of retribution if he thinks it entails or is 
defined as (he gives no definition) infliction of personal harm”. But it could also be against 
someone’s property rather than his person (or body). That important clarification aside, is this 
really “an unusual idea of retribution”? It seems fairly standard as the main meaning in 
dictionaries. And EFL does say what it means by “retribution” in various places, such as “with 
libertarian retribution the criminal creates a claim against himself to treatment as severe as he 
imposed on his victim” (113). The article then says, “The idea of retribution is to treat criminals 
according to their deserts”. Not as usually understood: ‘retribution’ mainly means some sort of 
punishment inflicted on someone, whether on his property or his person (but there is also a 
broader and less used ‘repayment’ sense). The article appears to have slipped into confusing 
one standard view of the more general idea of justice (as treating people “according to their 
deserts”) with the different and more specific concept of retribution. It asserts that, “if Lester 
wants to allow victims to inflict injury on their attackers, there is no reason (yet) to regard this 
as retributive, rather than merely brutal”. If other people are allowed to inflict an equivalent act 
against you after you proactively impose on them, then that is clearly “retributive” by any 
normal usage. That it is only ‘equivalent’ makes it unlikely to be any more “brutal” than what 
was first proactively imposed. The article has some implicitly modern ‘liberal’ or ‘progressive’ 
bias: all bleeding heart about the immediate effects, and no bloody brains about the long-term 
consequences. 
Of affronts to dignity as an aspect of crime, the article says, “nothing would follow about how 
affronts to dignity ought to be compensated; no reason is given why these require any special 
form of compensation”. Possible affronts to dignity are often a part of any foreseeable proactive 
imposition. They allow for retributive restitution for the same reason that any such impositions 
do. Whatever we proactively impose on others, we thereby give those others an equivalent 
claim to impose on us if they wish. The article continues, “or if they do, why it should take the 
form of infliction of physical harm on the attacker”. EFL does not say this, although the article 
repeatedly asserts that it does. The indignity-imposition aspect of a crime only allows for an 
equivalent reactive indignity-imposition, if that is preferred to financial compensation. The 
article then asserts, “And the same is true of fear, or any other psychological malaise a criminal 
might inflict. All can be compensated by money damages”. But what if the victim prefers 
compensation by way of inflicting equality of treatment? What libertarian principle stops this? 
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Why should we take seriously the article’s anti-retributive preferences? In any case, EFL 
explicitly says that taking the damages in money (or commodity equivalents) is always 
allowable, if that is what the victim prefers. Therefore, it is completely mistaken to claim that 
EFL asserts that “money damages … just aren’t the right kind of thing to use to compensate 
affronts to dignity”. 
The article agrees with EFL’s view that (as it paraphrases) “any penalty can be looked at [as] 
a cost that some inflictors might be willing to pay”. It then says, “imposing physical retaliation 
instead of monetary damages might restrict the number of one-sided purchasers, but does not 
resolve the theoretical problem”. There is no libertarian “theoretical problem” that any penalty 
can conceptually be viewed as a kind of cost (or price). But the article allows the forced 
purchase of proactive impositions without any risk of reciprocal treatment (which it even 
admits “might restrict the number of one-sided purchasers”); and for no libertarian reason. 
Taking that position is the only libertarian “theoretical problem” here.  
It is true that EFL “suggests that insofar as restitution allows one-sided purchase, restitution is 
actually incompatible with Libertarianism”. If I could not have my restitution in terms of 
similar claims against you, then I am not being allowed full libertarian restitution. This is not 
a “blow … to restitutionism” but a “blow” to anti-retributive restitutionism. It is, again, 
confused for the article to say that “one-sided purchase is possible on any theory of response 
to crime”. For a restriction to monetary restitution is literally to allow a forced purchase: I am 
exceedingly rich and I hate your guts; I will put out your eye and then pay you full financial 
damages for your loss and still laugh at your plight and think the money well spent. But 
allowing retributive restitution is nothing like a forced purchase: you now have the option of 
removing my eye or of demanding a sum of money not to do this act, which may vastly exceed 
what the court judges to be full financial restitution to you (because a very wealthy man would 
probably be able and willing to pay far more to keep both of his eyes). Allowing criminal 
‘forced purchases’ is unlibertarian and also consequentially bad. It is a very foolish error to 
assert that “An eye for an eye makes the whole world blind” (dubiously attributed to M. K. 
Gandhi, inter alios). If an eye for an eye is allowed, then that would empower the very poorest 
of victims and would thereby normally prevent any eye from being taken in the first place. An 
eye for an eye keeps the whole world sighted. 
According to the article, the victim who is financially compensated is “fully compensated. In 
theory, this means the victim is indifferent as between being deliberately infringed on and 
compensated, and not being infringed on at all”. But this is assuming what has to be explained: 
that such financial compensation can be adequate (or even the best that can be done). In realistic 
practice, this means that a victim will have to put up with whatever some court decides amounts 
to being “fully compensated”. If he would have preferred, some degree of, the retributive 
restitution to which he has a claim under libertarian theory, then he has not been fully 
compensated (or even as well as can be done). People sometimes say that they don’t care about 
the money; they want some perpetrator to suffer some appropriately bad ‘payback’ (instead, 
the worst that a heinous criminal will often ‘suffer’ is something that usually looks more like a 
life of leisure under ‘house arrest’, but with free board and lodging, until his eventual release).  
But then, after all this, the article produces this complete surprise: “Victims who do not think 
they are sufficiently compensated by money might be given the option of imposing physical 
harm on the criminal”. What?! This is, apparently, more or less EFL’s position. Hence, it is no 
longer clear that there is a, significant, disagreement in theory. The article continues that the 
problem is “that there is no acceptable measure for determining inter-personal comparability 
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of physical inflictions (notoriously, even death does not hold the same terror for everyone)”. 
But if ‘an eye for an eye’ is the correct physical libertarian principle, then this problem need 
not arise. And if an equal amount of inflicted disutility is the correct psychological libertarian 
principle, then this is only a similar problem to trying to assess how much a person suffered 
from some act and so how much monetary restitution is due. In both latter cases we have to 
resort to some ‘reasonable man’ assessment. Imperfect perhaps, but not hopelessly problematic 
and completely arbitrary. However, it is not immediately clear whether libertarian retributive 
restitution ultimately implies the physical or the psychological approach, or the victim’s choice 
of which one. (Eleutherological-conjecturalist libertarianism2 remains a relatively new theory 
with only one proponent to work out the implications.) 
Libertarian restitution, including retributive restitution, should be optimally deterring as 
regards both liberty and welfare: in short, because internalising (proactively imposed) 
externalities is both libertarian in itself and generally economically efficient. The article has 
not attempted to argue that it is not optimally deterring. It has merely assumed it and ignored 
EFL’s arguments to the contrary. Neither is it any longer clear why retributive restitution is not 
allowable under the article’s preferred system. Hence, it is incomprehensible that the article 
concludes that it has explained how “libertarian restitution cannot accommodate either 
deterrent or retributive concerns”.  
All of the issues the article raises have been dealt with. Perhaps, though, it would be useful 
briefly to restate the main argument on retributive restitution. Under the theory of liberty in 
EFL, libertarianism proscribes proactive impositions (at first purely abstractly, and 
subsequently against derived self-ownership and private property as practical applications). 
With foreseeable proactive impositions you treat someone’s person or external property as 
though it were your own. Some rectification is needed if we are to return to the, assumed, 
libertarian status quo ante (or as near to it as possible). A monetary payment might suffice if 
that is what the victim prefers. But what if the victim prefers an equivalent imposition to be 
inflicted on the perpetrator’s property or person? That is not a proactive imposition. It is an 
equivalent reactive imposition. We do impose on the perpetrator if we interfere with his money 
or property, but we do not proactively impose unless we go beyond full restitution. We do 
impose on the perpetrator if we interfere with his body, but we do not proactively impose unless 
we go beyond full restitution. There is no theoretical libertarian explanation for making an 
absolute distinction between someone’s external property and his body. The idea that we can 
never, unnecessarily, reactively impose on a criminal himself (we must, if possible, avoid 
harming a single hair on the head of a brutal serial murderer) is a form of modern ‘liberal’ bias 
that has no basis in libertarian theory.3 
 
2 See Lester, J. C., “Eleutherological-Conjecturalist Libertarianism: a Concise Philosophical 
Explanation”, PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/rec/INDNLA. 
3 There has been no discussion here of the risk-multiplier theory of libertarian restitution, and 
in what way that might also apply to retributive restitution; for that would add far too many 
complications and controversies. But see Lester, J. C. “Libertarian Rectification: Restitution, 
Retribution, and the Risk-Multiplier”, Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (2/3): 287-297 (2000), and 
Lester, J. C. “A Plague on Both your Statist Houses: Why Libertarian Restitution Beats State-
Retribution and State-Leniency”, in Simple Justice by Charles Murray (with commentaries), 
Civitas: London, edited by David Conway (2005). 
